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Rethinking of Literary Humanitarianism  
in Indra Sinha’s Animal’s People
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In the opening pages of Indra Sinha’s Animal’s People, the narrator 
recalls a journalist who solicited his story for inclusion in a book. The 
narrator greets the journalist, “Salaam Jarnalis, it’s me, Animal” (3) 
and speaks directly to him for a few pages before shifting his address to 
the journalist’s readership. In this article I read Animal’s dialogue with 
this particular journalist as an intertextual address that puts Animal in 
conversation with a specific strain of contemporary literature that mines 
sites of political violence for stories of suffering and positions the reader 
as a concerned hu man i tar ian.1 Animal indicts the journalist he meets, 
admonishing him: 
You were like all the others, come to suck our stories from us, 
so strangers in far off countries can marvel there’s so much 
pain in the world. Like vultures are you jarnaliss. Somewhere a 
bad thing happens, tears like rain in the wind, and look, here 
you come, drawn by the smell of blood. You have turned us 
Khaufpuris into storytellers, but always the same story. (5) 
Animal notices that journalists pursue a story that casts him and his 
fellow Khaufpuris as suffering, subaltern victims. His criticism of a 
publishing industry that surveys the carnage of political battlefields for 
narratives of suffering and reinforces an uneven power dynamic between 
a privileged reader and an unfortunate victim-turned-storyteller2 puts 
the project of literary testimony into question. 
In drawing out the novel’s challenge to stories that fetishize suffering 
in the name of literary testimony, this article is concerned with the 
intersection of several factors: that between text and reader, literature 
and contemporary political realities, and state government and the 
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international human rights community. It is at this nexus that Animal’s 
People expresses the difficulties its characters face decades after a fictional 
industrial disaster similar to the 1984 Bhopal gas leak and subsequent 
toxic contamination that killed—and is still killing—thousands in 
the North Central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh.3 I am particularly 
attentive to the way that the text configures its relationship to the reader, 
because it provides an opportunity to comment on conventions of literary 
hu man i tar ianism. In his discussion of the literary and legal narratives of 
human rights, Joseph Slaughter introduces the term “literary hu man-
i tar ianism” to describe “the Western desire for Bildungsromane of the 
non-Western other that is enacted through book markets” (314).4 He 
notes it “may be the latest in a series of globalizing forces that encourages 
the technology-transfers of human rights and the Bildungsroman” (314). 
I expand this definition of literary hu man i tar ianism beyond a discussion 
of the Bildungsroman and use this term to refer to literature that seeks to 
extend the scope of juridical power and the influence of human rights 
projects by way of a relationship between narrator and reader that treats 
literature as testimony. The literary hu man i tar ianism to which I refer 
operates according to the conviction that one may engage in a hu man-
i tar ian act by reading, and thereby witnessing, stories of trauma and 
suffering. It thereby approaches literature as testimony, figuring the 
narrator as one who testifies and the reader as witness to testimony. The 
way these subjects relate to each other reflects power dynamics between 
the state and the international community.
The literary hu man i tar ian model, which structures the type of 
story Animal senses the journalist is after, presents accounts of mass 
suffering that are focalized through a narrator’s experience as a witness 
to trauma. Often such literary testimony orients itself around the 
narrator’s and reader’s existential crisis (brought on by a confrontation 
with mass suffering) and how they deal with it by assuming the role 
of witness and, therein, supposedly relieving victims of an otherwise 
debilitating trauma. Approaching suffering primarily as an ethical 
concern is problematic because it depoliticizes suffering. The structure 
of literary testimony allows a privileged readership to contemplate 
suffering as evidence of a universal ethical crisis rather than a situated 
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political crisis,5 and it casts the reader-witness as a literary hu man i tar-
ian. The mechanics of this narrator-reader relationship reflect national-
international power dynamics that define the politics of human rights. 
As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak remarks, “‘Human Rights’ is not only 
about having or claiming a right or a set of rights, it is also about 
righting wrongs, about being the dispenser of these rights” (169). The 
human rights framework that structures literary testimony equates 
narrative voice with an agency that requires individuals to perform 
a particular subjectivity in order to access the right to have rights.6 
This conception of narrative voice and its relationship to subjectivity 
and the right to have rights excludes the subaltern from the rights 
infrastructure and reinforces the agency of those who endeavor to speak 
for him or her. The reader, in turn, is asked to validate the power of this 
narrative voice by acknowledging the Other’s suffering and completing 
the literary staging of the cathartic process by acting as a witness to 
testimony. 
One of the fundamental problems with literary hu man i tar ianism 
is that it presents political violence as unspeakable trauma and then 
suggests the secondary narrative it provides will overcome this trauma 
by articulating suffering within a testifier-witness dialectic between 
narrator and reader. By approaching political violence as unspeakable 
and prescribing testi mony to treat its symptoms, literary hu man i tar-
ian ism dislocates suffering from complex histories and politically and 
economically situ ated conflicts.7 I read Animal’s People for its critique 
of literary hu man i tar ian ism and its representation of a post human-
ist approach to narrative. The post human ist approach that I identify 
in Animal’s People offers an effective way of rethinking the portrayal 
of political violence as trauma. It not only disrupts narratives of 
development that are grounded in humanist ideas about the formation 
of a “civilized” subject but also critiques limiting conceptions of the 
“universal” human that literary hu man i tar ian ism attempts to rescue. 
This post human ist perspective is critical of the human rights discourse 
that often frames political violence, because within that framework, 
difference (and often sub altern ity) undermines an individual’s humanity 
and forecloses the right to have rights. 
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It is crucial to note that a post human ist reorientation, such as the 
one that Animal’s People encourages, does not imagine that people are 
no longer human. Rather it interrogates the discursive and ideological 
structures that allow for the supposed dehumanization of individuals, 
like Sinha’s Animal, who do not perform a normative human sub-
ject ivity. As Bart Simon clarifies, “the posthuman is figured not as a 
radical break from humanism, in the form of neither transcendence 
nor rejection, but rather as implicated in the ongoing critique of what 
it means to be human” (8). Animal’s People is critical of the discursive 
framing that positions some humans as agents of human rights and 
others as perpetually dependent on hu man i tar ian ism. In the novel, 
Animal chooses not to be human in the normative way that literary 
hu man i tar ian ism would require him to be. He narrates his struggle 
to figure out what it means to be a human animal after the industrial 
disaster that he calls the “Apokalis” (Sinha 366), which, if one were to 
deploy the language of human rights, has “dehumanized” his people. 
The novel ultimately calls this “dehumanization” into question and 
challenges a narrative structure that would allow a literary hu man i tar ian 
reader to rescue these “dehumanized” victims. 
The post human ist perspective that the novel offers calls into question 
the very possibility of dehumanization and is in fact very much focused 
on what it means to be human and what it means to be implicated 
as a dehumanized figure in a literary hu man i tar ian narrative structure. 
The novel stages the type of posthumanism for which Neil Badmington 
calls when he advises, “The ‘post-’ of posthumanism does not—and, 
moreover, cannot,—mark or make an absolute break from the legacy 
of humanism. .  .  . The writing of the post human ist condition should 
.  .  . take the form of a critical practice that occurs inside humanism, 
and should consist not of the wake but the working-through of 
anthropocentric discourse” (121; emphasis in original). Animal’s post-
apocalyptic story critiques the way that inequitable conceptions of the 
human have activated the possibility for the “Apokalis” and continue 
to allow for the mistreatment of “the people of the Apokalis” (366) via 
their “dehumanization.” The novel allows for a “working-through” of 
the “anthropocentric discourse” (Badmington 121) of human rights by 
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satirizing the literary hu man i tar ian narrative structure and challenging 
the way it converts situated political violence into “dehumanizing” 
trauma.
Whereas literary hu man i tar ianism calls on the reader to bear witness 
to testimonies of violence and trauma, Animal’s People complicates 
attempts to reclassify violence as trauma and to transcribe the corporeal 
experience of trauma into story. The many narrative and paratextual 
layers of Sinha’s novel illuminate the way stories are constructed 
according to the political circumstances in which they are told and who 
might be listening. The novel not only attempts to cultivate a particular 
relationship to the reader but also presents a model of reading within its 
narrative. Paying particular attention to tropes of the senses (particularly 
seeing and hearing), I track how the novel interrogates literary hu man i-
tar ian attempts to translate suffering via sensory descriptions that focus 
on overcoming crises of the imagination rather than addressing situated 
sociopolitcal and economic conflicts. I analyze how Sinha problematizes 
this exchange with the reader by mixing the metaphors of seeing and 
hearing. Though the type of literary hu man i tar ianism that the novel 
critiques encourages readers to respond to suffering, it maintains a 
problematic testifier-witness dialectic as a way to manage complex 
economic and political crises. Animal’s People stands out for the way it 
challenges literary hu man i tar ianism and demonstrates the utility of a 
post human ist orientation. 
Though Animal’s People is a work of fiction, its setting—a fabricated 
city called Khaufpur (“Khauf” meaning “terror” and “pur” a suffix 
meaning “city” in Urdu)—is modeled after Bhopal where the effects of 
a massive industrial disaster are still being felt and where Sinha’s efforts 
as an activist are focused. As Hilary Thompson recognizes, “Sinha firmly 
chooses the path of invention” (349) in order “[t]o make visible the city 
that the world doesn’t see . . . as though the speaker has to reconstruct 
the city’s world before a viewer’s eyes” (348). The narrator is part of the 
underclass of Khaufpur, and because of a spinal deformation resulting 
from exposure to the poisonous chemicals to which he is exposed, he 
walks on all fours and goes by the name Animal. Animal responds to 
the way in which the task of “reconstruct[ing] the city’s world before a 
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viewer’s eyes” (Thompson 348) relegates him to a particularly demeaning 
subjectivity. He initially rejects the journalist’s proposition for his story, 
refusing to provide a standard account of trauma and an appeal for 
human rights, but he eventually decides to tell the story that makes 
up the novel in order to deliberate on his existence and decide whether 
or not to have an operation, made possible by hu man i tar ian aid, to 
straighten his spine. As his narrative proceeds, he gradually cultivates a 
post human ist perspective through which he denaturalizes many of the 
assumptions of human rights discourse.
Animal’s People challenges textual engagements that reduce political 
violence to universal trauma, and it exposes how such narratives 
employ the discourse of human rights as they sustain inequitable 
power dynamics. The novel is about life in Khaufpur following 
an industrial disaster, but the text has many layers: there is a frame 
narrative within which Animal speaks into a series of tapes about 
himself and his people, and these are preceded by an editor’s note, 
appended by a glossary, and expanded upon at the website www.
khaufpur.com. The editor’s note, itself part of the fictional narrative, 
refers to Animal not by his name but condescendingly as “a nineteen-
year-old boy” (Sinha n.p.) and guarantees the authenticity of his 
narrative, which it insists is provided in his words, though they have 
admittedly been transcribed from tapes and translated from Hindi 
to English. The “Khaufpuri Glossary” and the website promises to 
provide further information on the fictional city and offers to further 
contextualize a narrative that the tongue-in-cheek editor’s note implies 
is supplied by a “native informant.” Ironically, on the website Animal 
voices his perturbation concerning the final publication of his story.8 
Additionally, as the website advertises an upcoming special reading of 
Dominique Lapierre’s City of Joy (a novel that attempts to resolve real 
world suffering in the Calcutta slum Anand Nagar—translated as City 
of Joy—by focusing on the joys of survival), it draws further attention 
to Sinha’s choice to set Animal’s People in Khaufpur—city of terror. 
Although fetishizing terror can just as easily distract from the sources 
of suffering as fetishizing joy can, by including Animal’s critique of 
Sinha’s novel and drawing further attention to Sinha’s narrative 
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choices, the website encourages the kind of critical reading for which 
the novel itself calls. 
Many critics have overlooked the nuanced ways in which this 
many-layered text parodies a testimonial narrative structure in order 
to challenge literary hu man i tar ian reading practices. For instance, 
in the frame narrative in which Animal talks into the tape recorder, 
he questions the likelihood that the tapes onto which he records his 
story will be accurately transcribed and properly understood by his 
readership. He continually challenges the reader not only to critically 
examine his or her expectations for a testimonial narrative of suffering 
but also to acknowledge how the act of telling a story is continually 
mediated. Yet some critics read the epistolary format as a weakness 
of the novel rather than as a productive formal vehicle for satirical 
critique. One reviewer describes the format as “an irritating framing 
device” that “is quickly forgotten until its unwelcome return in the 
final pages” (Jordison). Rather than consider why this format might 
be “irritating” to a reader who is not interested in questioning the 
politics of storytelling, the reviewer willfully forgets the framing device. 
Another reviewer expresses disappointment with the scenes in which 
“Animal suddenly becomes the messianic commentator for a mass 
movement, speaking in long, biblical sentences and wandering through 
a hallucinatory jungle” (Mahajan), because, this reviewer determines, 
“This makes for a muddled read” and is “impossible to reconcile with 
the conceit that Animal is recording his thoughts on tape” (Mahajan). 
Certainly the direct narration of Animal’s hallucinations cannot 
be reconciled with the conceit of the frame narrative, but this is a 
purposeful way to reveal to the reader how literary testimony is always 
a many-layered narrative construct. Such frustration with the novel’s 
framing device reflects a desire to receive the story as if it is a direct 
communication between a testifying narrator and a reader-witness. 
The text problematizes that fantasy and shows how the relationship 
between a subaltern narrator and a global reader is structured by 
socioeconomic inequalities and consumerist desires. Because of an 
inattention to the subversiveness of the frame narrative, the novel has 
been misinterpreted as either a story of “uplift” in which “hope surges 
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in all” after “an American arrives in Khaufpur in order to open a clinic” 
(O’Brien), or, at the other extreme, it has been grouped into a “sub-
genre of disaster seekers” along with “ambulance chasers and headline 
hunters” (Doctor). Yet it is these very types of narratives that the novel 
critiques.9 
From the start, Animal expresses aggravation with journalists who 
categorize him within the normative human rights story as a suffering 
body in need. As the novel opens, he challenges the journalist who solicits 
his story by arguing, “many books have been written about this place, 
not one has changed anything for the better, how will yours be different? 
You will bleat like all the rest. You’ll talk of rights, law, justice. Those 
words sound the same in my mouth as in yours but they don’t mean the 
same” (3; emphasis in original). The implication is that the many books 
that have been written about Khaufpur all tell the same human rights 
story citing “rights, law, [and] justice” to support an ethical argument 
against suffering. Perhaps these words have not made a difference 
because they do not correspond to particular political action, policy, or 
legislation. More significantly, such words do not mean the same thing 
when Animal says them because, as a subaltern subject, he cannot speak 
on his own accord and is without the right to have rights. Within the 
human rights framework he is only allowed to speak “the same story” (5); 
he is unable to access the “universal” tenets of “rights, law, [and] justice” 
without assimilating to the idea the journalist has of him and applying 
to the journalist for hu man i tar ian intervention. There is, however, yet 
another, more compelling reason these words mean something different 
when Animal uses them: rather than endorsing them as solutions to 
politically situated violence, he attempts to articulate them from a post-
human ist perspective.
The novel suggests that Animal offers a different story, not just the 
human rights narrative that journalists tell of Khaufpur. Animal is 
telling his story in an attempt to both express his outrage at a political 
situation and resolve a related personal quandary, but he insists that 
justice in Khaufpur should not be dependent on his narrating himself 
or other Khaufpuris as suffering victims. After having initially refused to 
tell the journalist his story within the parameters the journalist set for 
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it, Animal now decides he will tell his story his own way, insisting it will 
be a different sort of story. Acknowledging his first refusal, he reflects, 
What’s changed? Everything. As to what happened, well, there 
are many versions going round, every newspaper had a differ-
ent story, not one knows the truth, but I’m not talking to this 
tape for truth or fifty rupees or Chunaram’s fucking kebabs. 
I’ve a choice to make, let’s say it’s between heaven and hell, my 
problem is knowing which is which. (11) 
Animal specifically says he’s not talking “for truth,” meaning his goal 
is not to testify about the events that have occurred or the conditions 
in which he and his fellow Khaufpuris live. His intent is not to record 
a particular truth to prove his worth as a person and establish his right 
to have rights. The ethical framework of human rights is an ineffective 
way for Animal to navigate his situation, and thus he tells this story to 
explore other possibilities. At the end of the text, he reveals the dilemma 
that he faced when a letter arrived from the US informing him his sur-
gery would be paid for. Here he remembers that he decided to tell his 
story in order to determine if he should have the surgery or not, recall-
ing, “I will tell this story, I thought and that way I’ll find out what the 
end should be. I’ll know what to do” (365). Because it is initially unclear 
to Animal what justice that is not constricted by a humanist framework 
might look like, he tells his story without knowing how it will end. 
Animal sets out to tell a story to which he does not know the ending in 
order to contemplate what should come next in a narrative that refuses 
a normative humanist teleology. 
Once he has decided to tell his story, Animal begins to contemplate 
the prospect of addressing the readership the journalist had assured 
him would be interested in it. Recalling the journalist’s assertion that 
thousands would be able to see Animal through the book the journalist 
plans to write, Animal balks, “I think of this awful idea. Your eyes full 
of eyes. Thousands staring at me through the holes in your head. Their 
curiosity feels like acid on my skin” (7). Animal is sickened by the 
thought of becoming the object of the kind of spectatorship in which 
literary hu man i tar ianism enables the reader-witness to engage: he does 
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not want to become the object of the reader’s sensory experience so that 
this reader might be able to witness the traumatic effects of the chemical 
disaster in Khaufpur. Animal imagines, “What I say becomes a picture 
and the eyes settle on it like flies” (13). Animal objects to creating such 
a sensory experience for the reader and suggests that telling a story that 
appeals for human rights renders him and the Khaufpuris about whom 
he writes objects of decay. Creating a picture that draws readers “like 
flies” (13) does not allow him and his fellow Khaufpuris to be dynamic, 
multifaceted individuals whose existence transcends the disaster (and its 
mishandling) that they have endured. 
Identifying the reader of Animal’s narrative as an outsider who inhabits 
a radically different socioeconomic position, the text problematizes 
the relationship between Animal and the reader and details Animal’s 
struggle to redefine it. Animal draws attention to the absurd gap between 
himself and his readership, raging, “What am I to tell these eyes? . . . 
What can I say that they will understand? Have these thousands of eyes 
slept even one night in a place like this? Do these eyes shit on railway 
tracks? When was the last time these eyes had nothing to eat? These 
cuntish eyes, what do they know of our lives?” (7–8). Literary hu man-
i tar ianism encourages these eyes to gaze at Animal without allowing 
him to gaze back at them (on the other hand, Sinha’s many-layered text 
calls attention to the fact that Animal can speak to the eyes only via 
an intermediary). Animal challenges this framework by showing that 
these eyes are unable to see him and that they instead project an image 
of universal suffering onto him. He thus undermines the authority of 
these eyes and also emphasizes that he does not tell his story for these 
eyes. However, he finds that the normative humanist framework within 
which the contemporary publishing industry packages his story joins 
him in a dialectic with a readership that does not understand even the 
most fundamental elements of his life.10 
Animal alludes to the chasm between the reader and himself, noting 
the difficulty of communicating his story in the presence of socio-
economic, linguistic, and spatial differences. At one point he muses, 
“You don’t answer. I keep forgetting you do not hear me. The things 
I say, by the time they reach you they’ll have been changed out of 
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Hindi, made into Inglis et français pourquoi pas pareille quelques autres 
langues? For you they’re just words written on a page. Never can you 
hear my voice, nor can I ever know what pictures you see” (21). The very 
structure of the story—delivered as a series of tape recordings compiled 
by an unnamed editor—draws attention to the way that the publishing 
industry transcribes, translates, and transforms stories for a distant 
reader. Rather than portray a direct communication from Animal to 
the reader, the text highlights the many layers through which his story 
is filtered before it gets to the reader. Animal observes the instability of a 
reader with whom he shares neither personal space, common experience, 
nor language and whom he will most likely never meet nor be able 
to communicate with directly. Animal’s anger at the socioeconomic 
gap between his readership and himself and his consideration of the 
possibility for miscommunication undermine the premise of literary 
hu man i tar ianism—that the reader may act as a witness to resolve the 
conflict about which the narrator testifies. 
One way in which Animal attempts to realign the power dynamic 
between himself and his readership is to identify and address his reader 
as an individual rather than as “[t]housands” (7) of eyes “like flies” (13), 
devouring his story as decaying matter. He calls out to this reader, “In 
this crowd of eyes I am trying to recognize yours. I’ve been waiting 
for you to appear, to know you from all the others” (13), and then he 
speaks frankly to this individual reader: “You are reading my words, 
you are that person. I’ve no name for you so I will call you Eyes. My 
job is to talk, yours is to listen. So now listen” (14). Animal imagines 
the interaction between narrator and reader anew, attempting to 
circumvent preconceived ideas and hegemonic discursive structures 
that render the narrator-reader relationship unequal. He confronts and 
names the individual reader according to this person’s basic relationship 
to the text as a set of eyes. Asserting himself as the narrator whose job 
it is to talk and assigning his reader the job of listening, he positions 
himself as the expert and instructs the individual, whose eyes register his 
words, to listen rather than devour. As this metaphor of listening eyes 
mixes two different sensory experiences, the novel alerts the reader to 
the shallowness of his or her sensory experience as a reader-witness. By 
98
Jenn i f e r  R i ck e l
destabilizing the authority of sensory descriptions, the text reminds the 
reader that such simulations do not enable the reader to experience, and 
in turn heal, the suffering described. 
Animal continues to complicate the metaphor of witnessing through 
the senses as he indicates that his story requires the reader to actively 
listen because he tells it in a way that will disorient those who see the 
world from a normative perspective and expect to hear a standard human 
rights narrative. Remarking to the reader that “[t]he world of humans is 
meant to be viewed from eye level. Your eyes” (2), he acknowledges his 
reader’s normative way of perceiving the world. Not only does Animal 
literally see things from a different level (as he says, “Lift my head I’m 
staring at someone’s crotch. Whole nother world it’s below the waist” 
[2]) but he also sees things from his perspective as a human who is 
treated as inhuman and who defensively self-identifies as an animal. In 
doing so, he undermines the discursive framework of human rights: he 
warns the reader, “If you want my story, you’ll have to put up with 
how I tell it” (2). Because he does not fit within the rigid categories 
of a humanist framework, he attempts to tell his story and establish a 
relationship with the reader from a post human ist vantage point that he 
develops over the course of the narrative. A closer analysis will detail 
how Animal cultivates this perspective as his narrative progresses. Rather 
than enabling him to exist outside of or beyond the humanist moment 
within which he lives, a post human ist perspective allows Animal to 
denaturalize humanist assumptions and apply a critical lens to the 
human rights discourse that frames the corporate violence in Khaufpur. 
Animal demonstrates how the “Kampani” (the name the characters 
in the novel use to refer to the company responsible for the industrial 
disaster)11 and those governments that enable and protect it treat him 
and his people as less than human even as they prescribe hu man i tar-
ian aid as a way to absolve themselves from legal responsibility for the 
deaths and injuries of thousands of Khaufpuris. After abandoning their 
factory and eluding a trial for nearly two decades, the Kampani sends a 
team of lawyers to Khaufpur to negotiate a deal dismissing allegations 
against themselves.12 One of the Kampani’s lawyers, nicknamed “The 
buffalo,” proclaims to a crowd that has gathered in protest, “We’re here 
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to offer generous hu man i tar ian aid to the people of Khaufpur” (306). 
In turn, Gargi, an old woman whose back is almost as bent as Animal’s 
responds, “Mr. Lawyer, we lived in the shadow of your factory, you told 
us you were making medicine for the fields. You were making poisons 
to kill insects, but you killed us instead. I would like to ask, was there 
ever much difference, to you?” (306). Gargi’s question suggests that the 
Kampani treats the people who live around their factory in the same 
manner as the insects their chemicals were designed to exterminate.13 
Ignorant of Gargi’s insight and under the impression that she is simply 
asking for money rather than calling for the Kampani to stand trial and 
compensate for its offenses, “[t]he buffalo reaches in his red-lined coat, 
gets out his wallet. ‘Buy yourself something nice,’ he says. Old Gargi’s 
standing there with five hundred rupees [approximately ten US dollars] 
in her hand” (307).The lawyer’s patronizing reply to Gargi’s demand 
that the Kampani take legal and financial responsibility for the crimes 
it has committed against Khaufpuris illustrates how hu man i tar ian aid is 
offered as a way to defuse legitimate anger and distract attention from 
the much costlier and often irreparable damage that victims of corporate 
violence sustain. 
As one of these victims, Animal is offered hu man i tar ian aid to have an 
operation in the US that will repair his severely bent spine so that he can 
walk upright. Elli, an American doctor who has opened a medical clinic 
in Khaufpur and sustained a tumultuous friendship with Animal, has 
arranged for the operation. As Animal tells this story to decide whether 
or not he should undergo the surgery, he deliberates about his place on 
the spectrum between humans and other animals, and he increasingly 
challenges the humanist logic that constructs humanity as a distinct 
category. However, in the beginning of his narrative he still judges 
himself against a humanist standard. Animal’s first words to the reader 
are, “I used to be human once. So I’m told” (1). Rather than opening 
his account of himself by declaring his humanity as the standard literary 
hu man i tar ian narrative demands, the novel immediately pokes fun at 
the idea that Animal could be human at one point in time and not 
human at another. Furthermore, the fact that Animal’s status as a former 
human is a product of hearsay suggests that the identification of “the 
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human” is dependent on the cumulative judgments of others. Though 
he has no personal recollection of it, Animal was indeed born a regularly 
functioning human, but just days after the chemical disaster occurred at 
the factory in Khaufpur, its poison attacked his body, and, left untreated, 
he eventually could not walk upright. In the language of human rights, 
the Kampani’s negligence and refusal to compensate the people they 
poisoned or properly clean up the contaminated area to prevent further 
devastation have undermined his and his people’s humanity. 
Animal, who has a particularly visible physical deformity and has 
known no other way of being, reacts by outwardly embracing the 
persona of a non-human animal and shocking those around him into 
keeping their distance from him while he secretly wishes he were able 
to walk on two feet. Thus, he introduces himself growling, “My name is 
Animal. . . . I’m not a fucking human being, I’ve no wish to be one” (23). 
He explains to the reader, “This was my mantra, what I told everyone. 
Never did I mention my yearning to walk upright” (23). Animal at first 
expresses contempt for human beings and resists being associated with 
those who have treated him as a lesser form of life. Yet at the same time 
he covets the human capabilities that elude him. 
Animal is human, but he struggles to figure out a post human ist way 
of understanding his existence and his relationship to others. He at first 
accepts the normative understanding of what it means to be human and 
rationalizes, “if I agree to be a human being, I’ll also have to agree that 
I’m wrong-shaped and abnormal. But let me be a quatre pattes animal, 
four-footed and free, then I am whole, my own proper shape, just a 
different kind of animal from say Jara, or a cow, or a camel” (208).14 
Being a human who is “wrong-shaped and abnormal” would define 
Animal’s existence as defective and debilitating, and it would render him 
a body in perpetual need. Refusing to occupy the subject position of the 
victim who is compelled to parade his differences as marks of trauma to 
prove his humanity and appeal for the right to have rights, he initially 
portrays himself as a non-human animal. He at first suggests that by 
classifying himself as a non-human animal he frees himself from a state 
of inferiority. Yet this actually reinforces the strict categorization of the 
human, upholding the idea of the normative human and supporting a 
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distinction between humans and animals. What I wish to call attention 
to is the way in which Animal comes to realize that being human 
and being an animal are not mutually exclusive. This is important to 
recognize because, as Badmington suggests, “Post humanist cultural 
criticism must, I think, learn to listen out for the deconstruction of 
the binary opposition between the human and the inhuman that is 
forever happening within humanism itself. Turning the world upside 
down will no longer do. The other is always already within. Humanism 
is merely pretending otherwise” (151). Through Animal, Sinha’s novel 
deconstructs the binary between the “human” and “inhuman” that 
defines the “universal” subject of human rights. 
As the narrative progresses and Animal tells his story, his discussion 
of the human and the animal changes, becoming more nuanced. 
Whereas early in his story Animal upholds a distinction between the 
human and the inhuman animal, toward the end he defies this false 
binary. Ultimately deciding against the operation that would straighten 
his spine, Animal imagines a different possibility for himself than what 
the narrative trajectory of literary hu man i tar ianism would allow. Rather 
than seeing an operation made possible by generous hu man i tar ian aid 
as the thing (and the only possible thing) that will rescue him from 
his suffering, he realizes that conforming to a normative conception of 
the human may not actually be a suitable solution for him at all. He 
explains: 
See, Eyes, I reckon that if I have this operation, I will be up-
right, true, but to walk I will need the help of sticks. I might 
have a wheelchair, but how far will that get me in the gullis of 
Khaufpur? Right now I can run and hop and carry kids on my 
back, I can climb hard trees, I’ve gone up mountains, roamed 
in jungles. Is life so bad? If I’m an upright human, I would be 
one of millions, not even a healthy one at that. Stay four-foot, 
I’m the one and only Animal. (366) 
Animal recognizes that the surgery may not provide the relief it promises 
and that it may actually make his life more difficult. He instead embraces 
himself as a four-footed human animal with the understanding that his 
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humanity does not elevate him above other animals, human or non-
human. He thus embraces his moniker of “Animal” not as a metaphor 
for human deprivation but as a reminder of the animality of all humans, 
and acknowledging this animality enables him to think about what it 
means to be human in another way. Using a modifier in the phrase 
“upright human” (366), he nuances traditional definitions, decoupling 
what it means to be human from its normative discursive framing. He 
implies that because there are many ways of being human, difference 
should not undermine an individual’s humanity, and one should not 
have to prove this humanity. His name at once points to the fact that 
all humans are animals while identifying him as an individual as any 
other proper name would. As a four-footed human animal, he accepts 
his uniqueness (“the one and only Animal” [366]) rather than attempts 
to become another iteration of “universal” humanity. 
Even as he accepts himself, however, Animal does not pretend to 
solve the political problems that the text confronts. After telling his 
personal story, he concludes, “Eyes, I’m done. Khuda hafez. Go well. 
Remember me. All things pass, but the poor remain. We are the people 
of the Apokalis. Tomorrow there will be more of us” (366). With 
this brusque dismissal of his reader, Animal makes it known that by 
listening to this story the reader does not change the circumstances 
within which Khaufpuris (or the victims of the Bhopal disaster) live. 
Telling this story to the reader does not metaphorically release Animal’s 
people from the toxic conditions within which they suffer. The stilted 
series of farewells that Animal delivers replace the happily-ever-after 
resolution that the hu man i tar ian reader seeks and give way to the fact 
that “the poor remain” (366). The text refuses to establish a relationship 
between a subaltern narrator and a comparatively socioeconomically 
privileged reader that would enable the reader to engage in literary hu-
man i tar ianism. It reminds the reader that “the people of the Apokalis” 
(366), the poor people the reader does not usually see who are impacted 
by politically situated, corporate violence will not fade into oblivion 
beneath the chemical vapour from which they emerged in this narrative. 
Just as Animal refuses to assimilate to normative human subjectivity, 
the text reminds the reader that justice is not dependent on Animal 
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proving his personhood and thereby establishing his and his people’s 
right to have rights. Indeed, the text defies a possible repetition of the 
humanist framework by refusing to project Animal as a post human-
ist hero who embodies a universal “ethical” solution (this would 
merely expand the boundaries of the human rights framework without 
radically changing its logic). In many ways Animal’s behaviour is highly 
unethical: he poisons a fellow activist named Zafar out of jealousy of 
Zafar’s relationship with Nisha, a friend whom he secretly loves; he spies 
on and sexually objectifies Elli; and he may even have burned down the 
ruins of the factory, causing the second night of terror that reproduces 
the initial industrial disaster in Khaufpur. Animal certainly does not 
model a perfect post human ist ethics (such a model would after all only 
be a reincarnation of humanism by another name), and this is perhaps 
part of the point: justice should not depend on Animal exhibiting an 
attention-grabbing level of suffering and ethical correctness to prove he 
is worthy of rights. Neither should justice depend on Animal accepting 
hu man i tar ian aid to have an operation to remove visual evidence of a 
toxic past that remains perceptible in his crooked back. 
Animal asks the Eyes to listen to what he has to say about the Kampani 
rather than see him as the embodiment of a toxic past and consume his 
suffering according to the delusion that this will somehow relieve him 
of it. He represents his people’s suffering not to signify their worthiness 
of hu man i tar ian aid but to demand accountability from the Kampani. 
The point Animal is trying to make to the Eyes—to his readership—
is that justice should involve the Kampani facing trial. As Animal’s 
People encourages the reader to question the power dynamic between 
the poor people of the Apokalis and the privileged readers who devour 
their stories, it exposes systemic inequalities, calls for legal action, and 
challenges the logic of human rights and hu man i tar ian aid from a post-
human ist perspective. 
I have argued that by portraying conflicts involving corporate violence 
as a human rights concern and informing the reader about such situations 
by narrativizing the traumatic experiences of “native informants,” literary 
hu man i tar ianism detracts attention from the people who are responsible 
for such violence and from the power structures within which they 
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operate. While the intentions of the journalist who pursues Animal’s 
story exemplify the way in which literary hu man i tar ianism attempts to 
engage the reader as a witness in order to rescue the suffering bodies of 
those who have been victimized in national and international conflicts, 
Animal’s People interrupts the dialectic between the narrator-testifier 
and the reader-witness. Animal tells his story from a post human ist 
perspective, distinguishing between his own non-normative personhood 
and the Kampani’s legal responsibility for contaminating Khaufpur with 
toxic chemicals. Moreover, he emphasizes that his story does not resolve 
the transnational power struggle within which his people are victimized. 
Instead, his story unsettles “the human” that literary hu man i tar ianism 
sets out to rescue and calls attention to the way literary hu man i tar ianism 
effaces economic and political realities. The novel suggests that neoliberal 
economic policies and national-international power dynamics, which 
allowed for corporate violence against Animal’s people and continue 
to produce systemic inequalities in Bhopal and elsewhere around the 
world, should be of primary concern to readers.
While literary hu man i tar ianism attempts to negotiate competing 
national and international factions by appealing to human rights 
as apolitical and universal, Animal’s People shows that hu man i tar-
ianism is not neutral.15 The novel challenges the way that national and 
international sovereignties interact by taking issue with a trans national 
company that refuses to recognize national authority and a state that 
compromises the well-being of its people in order to serve its own 
financial interests. Animal’s People thus problematizes the discourse 
of human rights that literary hu man i tar ianism deploys to negotiate 
contradictory sovereignties. 
Not only does Animal’s People challenge the project of literary hu man-
i tar ianism, it also proposes another function for literature. Rather than 
concluding that literature is irrelevant to those who experience deep-
rooted, systemic inequality, pervasive economic instability, physical 
brutality, or other forms of political violence, we should recall Animal’s 
storytelling technique. Animal’s way of beginning to tell a story 
without knowing its end demonstrates that stories do not have to be 
oriented around an end result. Thus, literature may function as a space 
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within which to rethink the developmental narrative of human rights. 
Acknowledging that literature may transgress a humanist teleology and 
tell a story without knowing what comes next may be the first step in 
imagining ways of thinking that are not so limiting as current discursive 
frameworks.
Notes
 1 This growing body of work includes such texts as Gourevitch’s We Wish to Inform 
You that Tomorrow We Will be Killed with Our Families (1998); Krog’s Country of 
My Skull (1998, 1999); Hosseini’s The Kite Runner (2003); Mortenson and Relin’s 
Three Cups of Tea (2006); and Eggers’ What Is the What (2007). Gourevitch and 
Krog are also both journalists. 
 2 Snell notices how the novel, “draws attention precisely to the uneven relations 
of power that persist between post colonial texts and their readers at a moment 
when culturally-diverse commodities circulate widely in global markets” (1). She 
elaborates, “Reproducing the global circuits of exchange in which it is caught 
up, Animal’s People dramatizes the unevenness of power frequently embedded 
in relations between storytellers, story collectors such as the journalist, and their 
consumers” (5–6).
 3 According to the Bhopal Medical Appeal, “Half a million people were exposed 
to the gas and 20,000 have died to date as a result of their exposure. More than 
120,000 people still suffer from ailments caused by the accident and the subse-
quent pollution at the plant site.”
 4 Literary hu man i tar ianism is a function of post coloniality, which, Huggan 
explains, “pertains to a system of symbolic, as well as material, exchange in 
which even the language of resistance may be manipulated and consumed” (6). 
Huggan’s distinction between post colonial ity and post colonial ism—the latter 
of which “posits itself as anti-colonial, and that works toward the dissolution of 
imperial epistemologies and institutional structures” (28)—is useful in reading 
Animal’s People. As Sinha’s novel critiques post colo nial ity in the form of literary 
hu man i tar ianism, it stages the complicated way in which post coloniality and 
post colonialism are “mutually entangled” (Huggan 6).
 5 As Badiou explains, “According to the way it is generally used today, the term 
‘ethics’ relates above all to the domain of human rights, ‘the rights of man’ – or, 
by derivation, the rights of living beings. . . . We are supposed to assume the ex-
istence of a universally recognizable human subject possessing ‘rights’ that are in 
some sense natural. . . . ‘Ethics’ is a matter of busying ourselves with these rights, 
of making sure that they are respected” (4). However, “Rather then link the 
word [ethics] to abstract categories (Man or Human, Right or Law, the Other 
. . .), it should be referred back to particular situations. Rather than reduce it to 
an aspect of pity for victims, it should become the enduring maxim of singular 
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processes. Rather than make of it merely the province of conservatism with a good 
conscience, it should concern the destiny of truths, in the plural” (3; emphases 
in original). Animal’s People engages in a project to redirect ‘ethical’ concerns to 
the political and economic “situations” and “singular processes” that continue to 
victimize Animal and his people.
 6 Since human rights are not inherent, the human being must develop a legal 
personality by way of the state in order to establish what Arendt calls the “right 
to have rights” (294). Arendt elaborates: 
  The paradox involved in the loss of human rights is that such loss coin-
cides with the instant when a person becomes a human being in general – 
without a profession, without a citizenship, without an opinion, without 
a deed by which to identify and specify himself – and different in general, 
representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, 
deprived of expression within and action upon a common world, loses its 
significance. (297–8; emphasis in original)
 7 The distinction I make between attending to historically situated circumstances 
and testifying about suffering as a function of trauma indicates a historical dif-
ference between a human rights tradition that emerged in the 1970s in order to 
create a record of political violence and the hu man i tar ian movement that has 
grown since the 1990s. For more on this historical trajectory see Moyn.
 8 For further analysis of www.khaufpur.com, see Snell who suggests, “In using 
Khaupfur’s website to humorously implicate himself in the series of exploitative 
acts Animal imagines to have occurred in the production of the book, Sinha at 
once highlights the need for authorial accountability and places in check the 
pleasure some readers might take in consuming, and subsequently exotifying, 
the tragic and ostensibly true account of a traumatized young man living in the 
so called ‘Third World’” (3).
 9 Nixon also reads Animal’s People as a parody, interpreting it as “an exposé of . . . 
neoliberal double standards” (446). While he argues that Animal challenges neo-
liberal globalization as a picaro figure, he focuses on Animal’s body as an “image 
of a body politic literally bent double beneath the weight of Khaufpur’s foreign 
load” (450). In contrast, I argue that the novel critiques the testimonial narrative 
structure that allows Animal’s body to be read as a symbol of suffering. 
 10 Part of the reason that a US readership might not understand the circumstances 
in which Animal lives is because US reporting on international corporate vio-
lence like that in Bhopal may be slanted to protect the financial interests of US 
companies. For a comparison of US and Indian media responses to the Bhopal 
chemical leak see Mukherjee (136–38).
 11 The Kampani remains otherwise unnamed in the novel. But just as Khaufpur 
is generally understood as a fictional Bhopal, the Kampani is representative of 
Union Carbide India, Ltd. (now Dow), the corporation responsible for the tox-
ic contamination of Bhopal in December 1984. For over two decades no trial 
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took place, and it was only in June 2010 that Union Carbide India, Ltd., along 
with seven of its former senior employees, was convicted of death by negligence. 
These employees were sentenced to two years each in jail. Neither the company 
nor the Indian government has cleaned up the toxic chemicals at the plant.
 12 For commentary on the legal disputes following the Bhopal chemical disaster see 
Mukherjee (134, 139–43).
 13 Gargi’s question to the lawyer if there was ever much difference to him between 
the Khaufpuris who were poisoned and the insects that the poison was designed 
to exterminate (306) unwittingly re-inscribes the separation between humans 
and animals that supposedly protects humans from such unjust extermina-
tion. Rather than read this as an attempt to redraw the lines between humans 
and non-humans though, I suggest this is another moment in which the text 
highlights the inherent injustice of the humanist ideology that allows for the 
thoughtless extermination of some forms of life (human or non-human) for the 
perceived benefit of humankind.
 14 For more on Animal’s relationship with the dog Jara, as well as further analysis 
of other animals in the text, see Desblache (60). Additionally, see Mukherjee for 
a discussion of the way in which “Animal is able to mediate not merely between 
humans of various kinds but also between non-humans and humans” (152).
 15 For further critique of the supposed political neutrality of hu man i tar ianism see 
Brown. Brown argues that although hu man i tar ian activism “presents itself as 
something of an antipolitics” (453) and “casts subjects as yearning to be free of 
politics” (456), “there is no such thing as mere reduction of suffering or protec-
tion from abuse – the nature of the reduction or protection is itself productive of 
political subjects and political possibilities” (460; emphasis in original).
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